Empirical studies using survey data on expectations have frequently observed that forecasts are biased and have concluded that agents are not rational. We establish that existing rationality tests are not robust to even small deviations from symmetric loss and hence have little ability to tell whether the forecaster is irrational or the loss function is asymmetric. We quantify the exact trade-off between forecast inefficiency and asymmetric loss leading to identical outcomes of standard rationality tests and explore new and more general methods for testing forecast rationality jointly with flexible families of loss functions that embed quadratic loss as a special case. An empirical application to survey data on forecasts of nominal output growth demonstrates the empirical significance of our results and finds that rejections of rationality may largely have been driven by the assumption of symmetric loss.
Introduction
Expectations play a key role in economic analysis, affecting the decisions of households, firms and policy makers. This in turn has important consequences for macroeconomic dynamics as emphasized for instance by Friedman (1968) and Lucas (1973) . How agents form expectations and, in particular, whether they are rational and efficiently incorporate all available information into their forecasts is therefore a question of fundamental economic importance.
Ultimately this question can best be resolved through empirical analysis of expectations data. It is therefore not surprising that a large literature has been devoted to empirically testing forecast rationality based on survey data such as the Livingston data or the Survey of Professional Forecasters. 1 Summarizing this literature, Conlisk (1996, page 672) concluded that "Survey data on expectations of inflation and other variables commonly reject the unbiasedness and efficiency prediction of rational expectations."
The vast majority of empirical studies have tested forecast rationality in conjunction with an assumption of mean squared error (MSE) loss. This symmetric loss function has largely been maintained out of convenience: under MSE loss rationality implies that the observed forecast errors should have zero mean and be uncorrelated with all variables in the current information set. Yet, a reading of the literature reveals little discussion of why loss should be symmetric in the forecast error. One would, if anything, typically expect asymmetric loss as a reflection of the primitive economic conditions of the problem such as, e.g., asymmetric stockout and inventory holding costs or as a reflection of differences in the penalty associated with overshooting or falling short of a target in the case of policy makers. Similarly, Weber (1994) presents evidence supporting an asymmetric loss interpretation of judgments and decisions in psychological experiments with uncertain outcomes. A final possibility is related to strategic behavior arising in situations where the forecaster's remuneration depends on factors other than the mean squared forecast error, c.f. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) , Truman (1994) and Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) . Common features of the models used by these authors is that forecasters differ by their ability to forecast, reflected by differences in the precision of their private signals, and that their main goal is to influence clients' assessment of their ability. Such objectives are common to business analysts or analysts employed by financial services firms such as investment banks, whose fees are directly related to their clients' assessment of analysts' forecasting ability. The main finding of these models is that the forecasts need not reflect analysts' private information in an unbiased manner.
Asymmetries are potentially important since relaxing the symmetry assumption is known to profoundly change the properties of optimal forecasts as demonstrated early on by Varian (1974) , Waud (1976) and Zellner (1986) and more recently by Christoffersen and Diebold (1997) and Patton and Timmermann (2002) . Indeed, many studies on forecast rationality testing are aware of the limitations of symmetric loss and indicate that rejections of rationality may be driven by asymmetries. For example, Keane and Runkle (1990, page 719) write "If forecasters have differential costs of over-and underprediction, it could be rational for them to produce biased forecasts. If we were to find that forecasts are biased, it could still be claimed that forecasters were rational if it could be shown that they had such differential costs." Unfortunately, however, little is known about the determinants and magnitude of the problem-how much accounting for asymmetries really matters in practice.
In this paper we examine the theoretical and practical importance of the joint nature of tests for forecast rationality. Since Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) it has been standard practice to regress the realized value of the target variable on an intercept and the forecast and undertake a joint test that the coefficients on these terms are equal to zero and unity, respectively. We show that the coefficients in standard forecast efficiency tests are biased if the loss function is not symmetric and evaluate this bias analytically for an extension of the usually applied loss functions. Under asymmetric loss, standard rationality tests thus do not control size and may lead to false rejections of rationality. Conversely, even large inefficiencies in forecasters' use of information may not be detectable by standard tests when the true loss is asymmetric.
To demonstrate the empirical relevance of these points, we revisit the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data on US output growth and examine whether the apparently high rejection rate for rationality found in this data set can be explained by asymmetric loss.
We find strong evidence of bias in the forecast errors of many individual survey participants.
In fact, close to 30% of the individual predictions lead to rejections of the joint hypothesis of rationality and symmetric loss at the 5% critical level. Allowing for asymmetric loss, the rejection rate is very close to 5% which is consistent with rationality. Output forecasts thus tend to be consistent with rationality under asymmetric loss though not under symmetric loss. Furthermore, our estimates of the direction of asymmetries in loss overwhelmingly suggest that the cost of overpredicting exceeds the cost of underpredicting output growth.
Importantly, we also find that only a modest degree of asymmetry is required for the survey expectations to be consistent with rationality. This lends economic credence to our claim that asymmetric loss can explain the biases observed in the survey data. We temper the discussion of the empirical results by noting that the power of empirical tests of forecast rationality under asymmetric loss is likely to be quite weak for the typical sample sizes available when analyzing individual survey participants' predictions.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical evidence against symmetric loss and rationality in forecasts of output growth from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Section 3 adopts a flexible family of loss functions to examine standard econometric tests for forecast rationality based on quadratic loss and shows how they can lead to biased estimates and wrong inference when loss is genuinely asymmetric. Construction of rationality tests under asymmetric loss is undertaken in Section 4, while Section 5 presents empirical results and Section 6 concludes. Technical proofs and details of the data set are provided in appendices at the end of the paper.
Bias in Forecasts of Output Growth
Our paper studies forecasts of US nominal output growth-a series in which virtually all macroeconomic forecasters should have some interest. Forecasts of output growth have been the subject of many previous studies. Brown and Maital (1981) studied average GNP forecasts and rejected unbiasedness and efficiency in six-month predictions of growth in GNP measured in current prices. Zarnowitz (1985) found only weak evidence against efficiency for the average forecast, but stronger evidence against efficiency for individual forecasters.
Batchelor and Dua (1991) found little evidence that forecast errors were correlated with their own past values. In contrast, Davies and Lahiri (1995) conducted a panel analysis and found evidence that informational efficiency was rejected for up to half of the survey participants.
Data
The main data used in this paper is from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) which has become a primary source for studying macroeconomic forecasts. 2 
Forecast Unbiasedness Tests under Symmetric Loss
Under symmetry and quadratic loss-often referred to as mean squared error (MSE) lossforecast rationality has traditionally been studied by testing two conditions: (1) that the forecast under consideration is unbiased, and (2) that it is efficient with respect to the information set available to the forecaster at the time the forecast was made.
Tests of forecast unbiasedness typically use the Mincer-Zarnowitz (1969) regression:
where y t+1 is the value at time t + 1 of the target variable (US nominal output growth in our data), f t+1 its one-step-ahead forecast (produced at time t) and u t+1 an error satisfying
Under the null hypothesis of zero bias we should have β c = 0 and β = 1. Given that the forecasts f t+1 typically depend on estimates of the forecasting model, we will need to take into account the sampling error caused by this estimation (see, e.g., West (1996) , West and McCracken (1998) , McCracken (2000) , Swanson (2002, 2005a,b) ).
Appendix A provides details of the type of forecasting schemes that can be handled by our approach-the commonly used rolling window methods-and also lists a set of technical conditions assumed to be satisfied by the predicted variable (the 'target') and the variables serving as inputs in the prediction models. Table 1 shows the outcome of tests for bias in the forecast errors based on GMM estimation of (1). Under quadratic loss, using revised data for the actual values the null of no bias is rejected at the 1% critical level for 11 participants and gets rejected in 29 cases at the 5% level. 3 If MSE loss is accepted, this strongly questions rationality for a large proportion of the survey participants. On the other hand, if the forecasters incur different losses from over-and underprediction, it would be rational for them to produce biased forecasts.
The Impact of Asymmetric Loss on Standard Rationality Tests
To study the behavior of standard tests of forecast rationality when the forecaster's loss function allows for asymmetries we require a setup that nests MSE loss as a special case and-in view of the small survey samples typically available-allows for asymmetries in a highly parsimonious way. To this end we follow Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005) and assume that the loss function only depends on the forecast error, e t+1 = y t+1 − f t+1 , and belongs to the following two parameter family
with a positive exponent p and an asymmetry parameter α, 0 < α < 1.
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An attractive feature of the function in (2) is that it generalizes losses commonly used in the rationality testing literature. When p = 2 and α = 1/2, loss is quadratic and (2) reduces to MSE loss. More generally, when p = 2 and 0 < α < 1, the family of losses L 2 is piecewise quadratic and we call it 'Quad-Quad'. Similarly, when p = 1 and 0 < α < 1 we get the piecewise linear family of losses L 1 , known as 'Lin-Lin', a special case of which is the absolute deviation or mean absolute error (MAE) loss, obtained when p = 1 and α = 1/2. As α moves away from 1/2 in either direction the loss function becomes increasingly asymmetric.
Other asymmetric loss functions-most notably the linex loss function suggested by Varian (1974) and Zellner (1986)-could be used, but the ones in common use either do not nest MSE loss or do so at a boundary point of the parameter space which complicates hypothesis testing.
Misspecification Bias
Suppose that the exponent p = 2 in equation (2), so that the forecaster's loss function is piecewise quadratic or 'Quad-Quad',
L 2 is parametrized by a single shape or asymmetry parameter, α, whose true value, α 0 , may be known or unknown to the forecast evaluator. This loss function offers an ideal framework to discuss how standard tests of rationality-derived under MSE loss (α 0 = 1/2)-are affected if the true loss function is 'Quad-Quad' with α 0 6 = 1/2.
5
As previously discussed, forecast errors should be unpredictable under MSE loss so it is common to test forecast rationality by means of the efficiency regression
where e t+1 is the time t+1 forecast error, v t is a d×1 vector of variables (including a constant)
that are known to the forecaster at time t, and u t+1 is an error. Under standard stationarity assumptions, and assuming that a sample of forecasts running from t = τ to t = T + τ − 1 is available, the regression (4) tests the orthogonality condition E[v t u t+1 ] = 0, obtained under the assumption that the forecaster's loss is quadratic. If, in reality, the true loss function is 'Quad-Quad', the correct moment condition is
. In other words, by misspecifying the forecaster's loss, we omit the variable (1 − 2α 0 )|e t+1 | from the linear regression (4) and introduce correlation between the error term and the vector of explanatory variables. Hence, the standard OLS estimatorβ ≡ [
will be biased away from β by a quantity which we derive in Proposition 1:
loss L 2 , the standard OLS estimator,β, in the efficiency regression (4) has a bias that equals
where
The difference between the objective function in West and McCracken (1998) and our case is that they assume twice differentiability of the objective, which we do not have here because of the indicator function.
In other words, the misspecification bias depends on: (i) the extent of the departure from symmetry in the loss function L 2 , quantified by (1 − 2α 0 ); (ii) the covariance vector h V of the instruments used in the test, v t , with the absolute value of the forecast error, |e t+1 |; and (iii) the covariance matrix of the instruments, Σ V .
Some positive implications can be drawn from Proposition 1, improving our understanding of standard efficiency tests when the forecaster's loss is asymmetric (α 0 6 = 1/2) :
• In the usual implementation of efficiency regressions such as the one in (4), a constant is included in v t and we can write v t = (1,ṽ 0 t ) 0 . The first element of the covariance
Thus, when α 0 6 = 1/2, there will always be a potential for bias in at least the constant term, unless the absolute forecast error is zero in expectation. This can only occur in the highly unlikely situation where the forecasts are perfect and the forecast errors are zero with probability one, so standard tests of forecast rationality will in general be biased under asymmetric loss.
• Moreover, whenever the matrix Σ V is nonsingular, the bias that arises through the constant term will extend directly to biases in the other coefficients for each regressor whose mean is nonzero. This follows from the interaction of Σ This bias, however, will not affect the other coefficients of the OLS estimator.
• The bias ofβ decreases with the variability of the regressors. In other words, if the covariance matrix Σ V is sufficiently large, it can 'drown out' the bias.
• In practice, we can easily evaluate the relative biases for each coefficient in the efficiency regression (4) by simply computing the term Σ −1 V h V . For any degree of asymmetry, the latter can be consistently estimated by regressing the absolute forecast errors on v t . Such regressions should accompany results that assume quadratic loss, especially when there are rejections. They allow us to understand how sensitive the results are to misspecifications of the loss function, at least of the form examined here.
Power of Efficiency Tests
Misspecification of the loss function not only affects the bias of the standard OLS estimatorβ in (4) but also its asymptotic distribution. Hence, rationality tests implemented by traditional MSE regression based on the null hypothesis β = 0 might well lead to incorrect inference. Proposition 2 allows us to study the magnitude of this problem:
loss L 2 , the asymptotic distribution ofβ in the efficiency regression (4) is
V h V and the expression for Ω * V and its consistent estimatorΩ V are provided in Appendix A. For local deviations from symmetric loss (α 0 = 1/2) given by
(1 − aT −1/2 ), and local deviations from rationality (β = 0) given by β = bT −1/2 , with a and b fixed, the Wald test statistic based on the efficiency regression (4) is asymptotically distributed as Tβ
, a non-central chi-square with d degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter m given by
where the d-vector k V and the scalar ϕ V are defined in Appendix A.
Local (asymptotic) power of the Wald test for rationality (β = 0) is driven entirely by the noncentrality parameter m; hence, it suffices to consider this parameter to study the local power of the standard rationality tests in the directions of nonzero a and b.
What Proposition 2 shows is: (i) that for a wide range of combinations of the asymmetry parameter α 0 6 = 1/2 and the regression coefficient β 6 = 0 the noncentrality parameter m will be equal to zero: in such cases, efficiency tests will fail to reject the null hypothesis of forecast rationality even for large degrees of inefficiency; conversely, (ii) whenever a combination of β = 0 and α 0 6 = 1/2 leads to a strictly positive m, the efficiency test will tend to reject the null; in other words, false rejections of rationality are possible when the forecaster genuinely uses information efficiently (β = 0) provided loss is asymmetric (α 0 6 = 1/2). More specifically,
• Non-zero values of a and b have very different economic interpretations: b 6 = 0 implies that the forecasting model is misspecified, while a 6 = 0 reflects asymmetric loss. Only the former can be interpreted as forecast inefficiency or irrationality. Yet, for given values of ϕ V , Ω * V and k V we can construct pairs of values (a, b) that lead to identical power (same m). Standard efficiency tests based on (4) can therefore not tell whether a rejection is due to irrationality or asymmetric loss: they lack robustness with respect to the shape of the loss function.
• A large value of m can arise even when the forecaster is fully rational (b = 0) provided that |a| is large. 6 Spurious rejections of the rationality hypothesis follow whenever the absolute value of the forecast error is correlated with v t and the standard error ofβ is not too large.
• Conversely, suppose that the test does not reject, which would happen at the right size provided m = 0. This does not imply that the forecast is rational (b = 0) because we can construct pairs of non-zero values (a, b) such that m = 0. This will happen when the misspecification in the forecasts cancels out against the asymmetry in the loss function. The test will not have any power to identify this problem.
To demonstrate the importance of these points, Figure 2A plots iso-m or, equivalently, iso-power curves for different values of a and b, assuming a test size of 5% and v t = 1.
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Under MSE loss and informational efficiency a = b = 0. Positive values of a correspond 6 When a 6 = 0, the constant term in (4) is particularly likely to lead to a rejection even when the forecasts are truly rational. This bias will be larger the less of the variation in the outcome variable is explained (since E[|e t+1 |] is increasing in the variation of the forecast error). 7 For this case Σ V = 1 and h V is a scalar that can be estimated byĥ Economic interpretation of these results is facilitated by plotting the power contours in (α, β)-space, where the latter is reported in standard error units of the efficiency regression (4). For this plot-shown in Figure 2B -the iso-power lines become upward-sloping as larger values of α lower the loss-induced bias and hence cancel out against larger inefficiency biases, β. The figure shows that biases as large as 3.5 standard error units away from zero will be virtually undetectable provided the loss function is sufficiently asymmetric. Conversely, moving vertically along the β = 0 'rationality line', we find that strongly asymmetric loss can lead to a 90% chance of falsely rejecting the null of rationality.
Rationality Tests under Asymmetric Loss
The lack of robustness of standard rationality tests to asymmetries suggests that a new set of tests is required. In this section we describe two such approaches. The first approach is applicable when the shape and parameters of the loss function are known. This setup does not pose any new problems and least-squares estimation still applies, albeit on a transformation of the original forecast error. The second case arises when the parameters of the loss function are unknown and have to be estimated as part of the test. This framework requires different estimation methods which we describe below.
Known Loss
Under a loss function L, characterized by some shape parameter η, the sequence of forecasts is said to be optimal under loss L if at any point in time, t, the forecast f t+1 minimizes E[L(e t+1 ; η)|I t ]-the expected value of L conditional on the information set available to the forecaster, I t . This implies that, at any point in time, the optimal forecast error e t+1 satis-
e denotes the derivative of L with respect to the error e t+1 . When both L and η are known we can simply transform the observed forecast error e t+1 and test the orthogonality conditions by means of the 'generalized' efficiency regression
where the error term u t+1 satisfies E[v t u t+1 ] = 0. Under standard regularity conditions, the linear regression parameter β can be consistently estimated by using the ordinary least
e (e t+1 ; η)]. As for the standard quadratic case in (4), forecast rationality under L is equivalent to having β = 0. Hence, under general loss a test for rationality can be performed by: (i) first transforming the observed forecast error e t+1 into L 0 e (e t+1 ; η), then (ii) regressing the latter on v t by means of the regression (8) and finally (iii) testing the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients are zero, i.e. β = 0.
To demonstrate this type of test, suppose that it is known that the forecaster has a 'Quad-Quad' loss function with known asymmetry parameter α 0 6 = 1/2. For this case the generalized efficiency regression takes the simple form
When α 0 equals one half, the previous regression collapses to the one traditionally used in tests for strong rationality (4). Assuming that the forecaster's loss is quadratic, (α 0 = 1/2), amounts to omitting the term (1 − 2α 0 )|e t+1 | from the regression (9). Whenever α 0 6 = 1/2, the estimates of the slope coefficient β in the resulting efficiency regression (4) are biased.
This finding is as we would expect from the standard omitted variable bias result with the difference that we now have constructed the omitted regressor.
Unknown Loss Parameters
For many applications both L and η are unknown to the forecast evaluator. One way to proceed in this case is to relax the assumption that the true loss is known by assuming that L belongs to some flexible and known family of loss functions but with unknown shape parameter, η. Forecast rationality tests merely verify whether, under the loss L, the forecasts are optimal with respect to a set of variables v t , known to the forecaster. They can therefore be viewed as tests of moment conditions, which arise from first order conditions of the forecaster's optimization problem. Traditional rationality tests, such as the one proposed by Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) , adopt a regression based approach to testing these orthogonality conditions. A natural alternative is to use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework as in Hansen (1982) . The benefits of the latter are easily illustrated in the 'Quad-Quad' case. If the asymmetry parameter, α 0 , is unknown it is impossible to compute the term (1 − 2α 0 )|e t+1 | and hence not feasible to estimate the regression coefficient β in (9). However, it is still possible to test whether the moment conditions The statistic suggested by Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005) for testing the null hypothesis that the forecasts are rational takes the form of a test for overidentification:
HereŜ is a consistent estimator of
In other words, the GMM overidentification test Intuitively, the power of our test arises from the existence of overidentifying restrictions.
In practice, for each element of v t we could obtain an estimate for the asymmetry parameter, α 0 , that would 'rationalize' the observed sequence of forecasts. However, when the number of instruments, d, is greater than one, our method tests that the implied asymmetry parameter is the same for each moment condition. If no common value for α 0 satisfies all of the moment conditions, the test statistic J in (10) becomes large. This explains why the test still has power against the alternative that the forecasts were not constructed rationally and why it is not possible to justify arbitrary degrees of inefficiency in the forecasts by means of asymmetric loss: if the forecasts did not efficiently use the information in v t , thenα would be very different for each of the moment conditions and the test would reject.
Although this approach does not impose a fixed value of α 0 , it maintains that the loss function belongs to the family (2) with exponent p = 2 and the test (10) provides a joint test of rationality and this assumption. The advantage of this approach is that it loses little power since only one parameter has to be estimated. It is possible to take an even less restrictive approach and estimate the moment conditions non-parametrically. However, this is unlikely to be a useful strategy in view of the short survey data samples typically available.
Empirical Results
To see how asymmetric loss affects the empirical results from Section 2, derived under MSE loss, we proceed to test rationality of the output forecasts under 'Quad-Quad' loss. We present results using seven different sets of instruments, v t , based on a constant, lagged forecast errors, lagged outcomes, lagged forecasts and lagged absolute forecast errors. The lagged value is subtracted from the forecasts and past realizations to avoid that the instrument is overly persistent−too strong persistency could lead to difficulties in the ability of the asymptotic theory to approximate the finite sample behavior of the tests. Our instruments are similar to those adopted in the literature to test for rationality under MSE loss (see, e.g., Keane and Runkle (1990), Brown and Maital (1981) and Zarnowitz (1985) ) and have power to detect predictability in forecast errors such as serial correlation.
Before presenting the results it is worth asking whether asymmetries matter for macro- Table 2 shows the outcomes of two separate tests for rationality when we use the real-time value of the outcome variable. The first test is for the joint hypothesis of rationality and symmetric loss (α 0 = 1/2). The second test is for rationality but allows for asymmetry within the context of the more general family of 'Quad-Quad' loss functions. The null of symmetric loss and rationality gets rejected at the 1% level for between 11 and 41 of the forecasters. Across instruments we observe between 19 and 56 rejections at the 5% level and between 28 and 70 rejections at the 10% level. The results are very different when we no longer impose symmetry on the loss function. For this case the number of rejections is zero for four of the seven instruments, and it is close to the 5% and 10% nominal values for most instruments except for perhaps the constant and change in the forecast (instruments number five). For example, with instrument=2 or instrument=3, we find 7/108 and 5/108 or 6.5% and 4.6% of all cases reject at the 5% significance level whereas 13 and 12 of 108 cases, corresponding to 12.0% and 11.1%, respectively, reject at the 10% significance level.
Rationality Tests and Estimates of Loss Parameters
When the fully revised value is used for the target variable the results are quite similar, although the number of rejections tends to increase a bit under the null of symmetric loss.
When loss is allowed to be symmetric, the strongest evidence against the null of rationality comes from the instrument set that uses a constant and the change in the forecast.
Standard tests of forecast rationality thus have reasonable power in the direction of detecting asymmetry in the loss function. In fact, rejections of the joint hypothesis of rationality and symmetry appear mostly to be driven by the symmetry assumption. Our rejection frequencies under asymmetric loss are close to the size of the test and hence suggest little evidence against the joint null of asymmetric loss and efficient forecasts.
So far we have not discussed the α-estimates although clearly there is considerable economic information in these values which should reflect the shape of the forecasters' loss function. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the 108 α-estimates computed using (11) for v t = 1.
The evidence is clearly indicative of asymmetric loss. Importantly, the α−estimates suggested by our data do not appear to be 'extreme' and are clustered with most values in the range between 0.3 and 0.5. A value of α equal to 0.40 corresponds to putting one and a half times as large a weight on negative forecast errors as on positive ones. We might have found α-values much closer to zero in which case the degree of asymmetry required to explain biases in the forecasts would have to be implausibly large. Hence only a relatively modest degree of asymmetry in the loss function is required to overturn rejections of the null hypothesis.
Nominal versus Real output
So far we analyzed the data on nominal output growth, but it is of separate interest to consider real output forecasts. To this end tables 4 and 5 show results for real output based on real-time and fully-revised data. The results show that there is still strong evidence against forecast rationality and symmetric loss independent of the type of instrument used.
For example, the rejection rates at the 5% level are mostly between three and four times as high as expected under the null. Conversely, the evidence against rationality is far weaker once we allow for asymmetric loss, particularly when the fully revised data is used for the target variable. These results suggest that forecasts of both the real part and the inflation component of output growth matter in explaining the earlier findings for nominal output growth.
Bias and Type of Forecaster
The SPF data does not identify the affiliation of the forecaster. It is natural, however, to expect the extent of loss asymmetry to be different for forecasters associated with academia, banking and industry. It seems more plausible that academics have less of a reason to produce biased forecasts than, say, industry economists whose forecasts are produced for a specific firm or industry and thus-at least in theory-should put more weight on positive forecast errors if, e.g., inventory costs exceed stockout costs. It is more difficult to conjecture the size and direction of the bias for the banking forecasters. If these were produced for clients that were fully hedged with regard to unanticipated shocks to economic growth, one would expect α-estimates closer to one-half. However, if bank losses arising from over-predictions of economic growth exceed those from underpredictions, again we would expect more α-estimates below one-half than above it.
To consider this issue, we used data from the Livingston survey which lists the forecaster's affiliation. Unfortunately this data set tends to be much shorter as forecasts are only generated every six months. We therefore only required a minimum of 10 observations. This leaves us with 12 industry, six academic and 15 forecasters from the banking sector-admittedly a very small sample.
The α-estimates for these forecasters are shown in Figure 4 . Academic forecasters tend to produce α-estimates closer to one-half than the forecasters from industry and banking.
The spread in α−estimates is 0.086, 0.132 and 0.162 across the academic, industry and banking forecasters. The joint null of rationality and α 0 = 1/2 is not rejected for any of the academic forecasters, while this hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level for one of the industry forecasters and for six of the banking forecasters. While this evidence is by no means conclusive given the very small sample available here, it is indicative that differential costs associated with positive and negative forecast errors play a role in explaining forecast biases.
Conclusion
Empirical studies frequently find that forecasts from survey data are biased. Does this mean that forecasters genuinely use information inefficiently and hence are irrational or simply that they have asymmetric loss? We have shown in this paper that standard forecast efficiency tests often cannot distinguish between these two possible explanations. The importance of this point-which many previous papers have expressed concern about-was validated empirically as we found that rejections of rationality may largely have been driven by the assumption of symmetric loss. Conversely, we should not necessarily conclude from the failure to reject the null when we allow for asymmetric loss that forecasters are rational in view of the limited ability of rationality tests to identify inefficient use of information in survey samples on individual forecasters as small as those used here. It is clear from our results, however, that many empirical findings that rejected forecast rationality could be revisited using the generalized Mincer-Zarnowitz test proposed here that allows for asymmetric loss in a parsimonious manner.
Overall, our results suggest that the assumption of symmetric, quadratic loss in standard tests of forecast rationality is a key limitation to such tests. Our empirical findings raise the question whether the degree of asymmetry in the loss function required for forecasts to be efficient is excessive given what is known about the forecasting situation. There is, of course, a precursor for this type of question. In finance, the equity premium puzzle consists of the finding that the value of the risk aversion parameter required for historical stock returns to be consistent with a representative investor model appears to be implausibly high, c.f. Mehra and Prescott (1985) . In our context, the empirical findings suggest that often only a modest degree of asymmetry is required to overturn rejections of rationality and symmetric loss.
The results therefore point towards the need for collecting data on the costs associated with forecast errors of different signs and magnitude in order to better understand the forecasters' objectives. 
Data Appendix

Appendix A
This appendix describes the forecasting setup, lists the assumptions used to establish Propositions 1 and 2 and defines the terms referred to in the latter. We use the following
Forecasting scheme:
As a preamble to our proofs, it is worth pointing out that the estimation uncertainty of the observed forecasts, which we hereafter denotef t+1 , gives rise to complications when testing rationality. The models used by the forecasters to produce {f t+1 } T +τ −1 t=τ are typically unknown to the econometrician or forecast user. Indeed, there are a number of different forecasting methods which can be used by the forecasters at the time they make their forecasts, most of which involve estimating (or calibrating) some forecasting model. In addition to different models employed, forecasts may also differ according to the forecasting scheme used to produce them. For example, a fixed forecasting scheme constructs the in-sample forecasting model only once, then uses it to produce all the forecasts for the out-of-sample period. A rolling window forecasting scheme re-estimates the parameters of the forecasting model at each out-of-sample point t by using k most recent observations (k fixed). In contrast, a recursive scheme assumes that k increases together with t.
In what follows, we assume that all the observed forecasts-from some date τ to τ + T as depicted in the figure above-are made by using a rolling forecasting scheme so that the observed forecastsf t+1 are of the formf (w t , ..., w t−k ). (We need this condition in order to preserve the mixing property of the sequence {w t } which we assume in our assumption (A4).) Note that the use of recursive scheme is not permitted in our setup as it would violate the condition that the forecasts depend only on some finite number of lagged w t 's.
On the other hand, the use of fixed scheme is not permitted since in that case, the forecast estimation uncertainty would not 'wash out' out-of-sample. (This is what our assumption (A5)(ii) requires.)
Throughout the proofs we assume that the forecasters' objective is to solve the problem
and thus define a sequence of optimal forecasts {f * 
as τ → ∞ and T → ∞.
Definitions:
,
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1. In the first part of this proof we show thatβ p → β * , where
. We then use this convergence result in the second part of the proof to derive the expression for the misspecification bias ofβ. Recall from Section 4 that the standard OLS estimator isβ = [
In order to show that β p → β * , it suffices to show that the following conditions hold: In order to show (ii) and (iii), we use a law of large numbers (LLN) for strictly stationary and α-mixing sequences (e.g., Corollary 3.48 in White, 2001) . By assumptions (A2) and (A3) we know thatf t+1 and v t are constant measurable functions of w t which by (A4) is a strictly stationary; hence,
, whereê t+1 = y t+1 −f t+1 , is strictly 
is also α-mixing with mixing coefficient α of the same size −r/(r − 2), r > 2. Note that by lettingr = r/2 this last property implies that
is α-mixing with mixing coefficient α of size −r/(r − 1),r > 1, which is the dependence assumption of Corollary 3.48 in White, 2001 . We now need to check that additional moment conditions onê t+1 v t and v t v 0 t hold. For δ > 0 we have r + δ > 2 and r + δ/2 = r/2 + δ/2 > 1 so by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and assumption (A4) (because
Applying the results from Corollary 3.48 in White (2001) Similarly,
Hence there exists some n r,δ ∈ R + * , n r,δ < ∞, such that
where we have used (A2) and (A4). Hence, our previous argument applies to the sequence
as well, and we conclude that T 
where the last inequality uses
. Combined with our previous result this shows that (iii) holds. Hence, we conclude thatβ
We now use this convergence result to derive the bias inβ. We know from Section 4 that the parameter β in the generalized regression (9) satisfies the set of identifying constraints
, which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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Proof of Proposition 2. We now show that T 1/2 (β − β * ) is asymptotically normal by expanding the first order condition forβ around β * :
The idea then is to use (i)
, to show by Slutsky's theorem that
10 Moreover, these results ensure thatĥ
t , which makes the estimation of the bias components straightforward.
The remainder of the asymptotic normality proof is then similar to the standard case: the positive definiteness of Σ −1 V , and the consistency ofΣ V = T −1
We then use the limit result in (14) and Slutsky's theorem to show that
with Ω *
V which is what Equation (6) in Proposition 2 states. Hence, we need to show that conditions (i) and (ii) hold: For (i) it is sufficient to show that T −1/2
Note that (A4) implies E[|v t |] < ∞, so that, for any given ν > 0, by (A5)(i) and Chebyshev's inequality we have
as τ → ∞ and T → ∞. Together with (A5)(ii) this last property implies that
We now show that (ii) holds as well, i.e. that T 
Knowing that E[|e *
by assumptions (A1) (β * is an element of a compact set) and (A4). Assumption (A3) moreover ensures that the matrix ∆ V (β * ) is positive definite, so that the CLT implies
). This shows that (ii) holds. Hence we are done with establishing the limit result in Equation (6) .
We now need to show that moreover the asymptotic covariance matrix Ω *
t ] has been shown in the proof of Proposition 1. It therefore remains to be shown that
. This, combined with the fact that Σ −1
V is positive definite, will guarantee the consistency ofΩ V for Ω * V . Now, note that
where ε t+1 ≡ u t+1 + (1 − 2α 0 )|e * t+1 | and u t+1 is the error term in the generalized efficiency regression (9). Hence,
In order to show that ∆ V (β * ) can be consistently estimated by∆ V (β) we show (i) that
Using the same reasoning as above, we can show that T −1/2
Together with (A5)(ii) and the consistency ofβ,β
is α-mixing with mixing coefficient α of size −r/(r − 1),r > 1 (e.g. Theorem 3.49 in White, 2001 It follows from the first part of the proposition that the first term is asymptotically χ Note: this table reports the number of forecasters (out of a total of 108) for whom the null of unbiasedness and symmetric loss (α = 0.5) could be rejected at the specified critical values. Inst=1  24  30  36  2  14  21  Inst=2  25  38  46  0  7  13  Inst=3  11  19  28  0  5  12  Inst=4  13  24  30  0  3  7  Inst=5  22  36  47  3  14  28  Inst=6  24  35  44  0  6  16  Inst=7  41  56  70  1  9 17 Note: this table reports the number of forecasters (out of a total of 108) for whom the null of rationality and symmetry (α = 0.5) and rationality alone (α unconstrained) could be rejected at the specified critical values. The instruments are as follows: Inst = 1: constant plus lagged errors; Inst = 2: constant plus lagged errors (two lags); Inst = 3: constant plus absolute lagged errors; Inst = 4: constant plus lagged change in actual values; Inst = 5: constant plus change in forecasts (forecast -y(t-1)); Inst = 6: constant plus lagged errors, and lagged change in actual values; Inst = 7: constant plus lagged errors, lagged change in actual values, and change in forecasts. 
